

Can We Teach the Intuitive Dog New Tricks? Reconciling Jonathan Haidt's Viewpoint Diversity with His Moral Psychology

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In recent years, many scholars drew attention to political polarization in academia and attempted to reduce it. Jonathan Haidt, a social psychologist, suggests that his framework of "viewpoint diversity" can reduce polarization. However, this framework contradicts his earlier work, especially the "social intuitionist model." On the one hand, he argues that reason is not crucial to changing someone's mind. He uses the metaphor of a dog who makes intuitive decisions and wags its tail (reason) to communicate and justify them. On the other hand, he believes that scholars can change each other's minds on political issues through reason. This paper seeks to reveal the tension between "viewpoint diversity" and the "social intuitionist model" and to reconcile it. In order to ground these frameworks into social psychological theories, this paper examines the social intuitionist model in relation to cognitive dissonance theory and suggests modifications to Haidt's "viewpoint diversity" based on cognitive reappraisal.

Keywords: social intuitionist model, moral judgment, political diversity, cognitive bias, academic research

De nombreux chercheurs ont souligné la polarisation politique en milieu universitaire afin d'y remédier. Jonathan Haidt, psychologue social, suggère un cadre de « diversité des points de vue » résolvant cette polarisation. Ce cadre entre, toutefois, en contradiction avec son « modèle intuitionniste social ». D'une part, il soutient que la raison est superflue dans l'influence d'opinions, utilisant la métaphore d'un chien agissant par intuition. Ce dernier use de la raison en remuant la queue afin de justifier ses décisions. D'un autre côté, il estime que les chercheurs peuvent changer d'avis sur des questions politiques grâce à la raison. Cet article explore la tension entre la « diversité des points de vue » et le « modèle intuitionniste social », tentant de les réconcilier. Il suggère des modifications au concept de « diversité des points de vue » de Haidt, se basant sur une réévaluation cognitive et la théorie de la dissonance cognitive.

Mots-clés : modèle intuitionniste social, jugement moral, diversité politique, biais cognitifs, recherche universitaire

Political polarization is a pressing issue influencing the lives of many individuals both in the United States and around the world (Carothers & O'Donohue, 2019; Casal Bértoa & Rama, 2021; Graham & Svobik, 2020). It is defined as the set of changes that occur after the division of a society into opposing factions that contradict each other in terms of political views, beliefs, ideologies, and values (Duignan, 2023). Understanding the implications of political polarization and investigate methods to mitigate it is crucial, considering its wide impact. Jonathan Haidt, a renowned social psychologist, and many other scholars argue that academia falls prey to this political polarization and the higher education institutions in the US are lacking political diversity (Duarte et al., 2015). They argue that lack of political

diversity hinders the quality of research, and he promotes the framework of "viewpoint diversity" to solve this issue. The goal of this framework is to encourage students from diverse backgrounds to engage with each other to increase the quality of academic research. Haidt believes that meaningful discussions and active engagement from diverse political perspectives can produce better research outcomes that can benefit a wider population (Duarte et al., 2015, p. 51). Although this framework could hold merit, the argument of the following paper is that it contradicts Haidt's earlier work on the "social intuitionist model". In the social intuitionist model, Haidt argues that humans mostly make decisions based on intuitions, not reason. He claims that humans use reasoning to justify their decisions. The goal of this article is to reconcile the obvious tension between these frameworks by suggesting modifications to the social intuitionist model and alternative methods to mitigate the political polarization issue in academia.

Cognitive Dissonance Theory

Before detailing Haidt's frameworks, it is first

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important to understand how they relate to well-established theory in social psychology. This understanding is essential to highlight their significance and value. Social psychology has long examined how individuals interact with conflicting views both individually and interpersonally. In his theory of cognitive dissonance, Leon Festinger, a renowned social psychologist, claims that experiencing inconsistent views causes a sense of discomfort. He labels this inconsistency as dissonance, consistency as consonance, and he uses the term cognition to refer to knowledge, belief, and opinions about one's behavior, environment, and oneself (Festinger, 1957). He argues that if a smoker is told that smoking is unhealthy and keeps smoking despite this knowledge, they will experience psychological discomfort. This, in return, will lead them to a rationalization process to reduce the discomfort (Festinger, 1968). For example, the smoker could start thinking that smoking is not as unhealthy as everyone claims it to be, that they do not smoke that often, or that the consequences of quitting may be more detrimental than the act of smoking itself. Although alternatives to the cognitive dissonance theory have been suggested (Aronson, 1969; Bern, 1967; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999; Zanna & Cooper, 1974), this theory continues to play an important role in our understanding of how we process inconsistent views.

Moreover, recent research examining the neural correlates of cognitive dissonance shows that when presented with counterarguments, people tend to hold on more to their pre-existing political, religious, and moral beliefs (Kaplan et al., 2016; Kunda, 1990; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). The experience of dissonance is associated with the activation of emotional responses such as anxiety, stress, and fear within the amygdala and insula (Buhle et al., 2014; Kaplan et al., 2016), which supports Festinger's claim that dissonance causes psychological discomfort (Festinger, 1968).

Haidt's Frameworks

In his social intuitionist model, Haidt claims that human reason primarily serves "intuition", and humans use their reason as "a lawyer to justify intuitions" instead of "a judge searching for truth" (Haidt, 2001, p. 814). He also uses the metaphor of a dog to further elaborate on this claim. According to him, humans make moral decisions intuitively and use their reasoning to communicate and justify their decisions, like an intuitive dog wagging its tail rationally to communicate its decisions. Additionally, he argues that humans rarely change their minds, and when they do, it mostly happens through effective social persuasion and conformity instead of active reasoning. Although he does not directly build on the cognitive dissonance theory, Jonathan Haidt's social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001) invites a comparative analysis with it.

One can argue that intuition in Haidt's model is similar to cognitive dissonance theory's beliefs and views. Moreover, similar to the rationalization process to reduce dissonance in the cognitive dissonance theory, reason in the social intuitionist model justifies the decisions one makes based on intuitions. Haidt (2000) acknowledges that his model is inspired more by philosophy, particularly David Hume's philosophy of *moral sentimentalism*. Moral sentimentalism claims that emotions play a more important role in leading our moral decisions than reason (Kauppinen, 2021). Similarly, Haidt argues that reason is less effective in making moral decisions (Haidt, 2001; Haidt 2003; Haidt et al., 2000). However, unlike Hume, Haidt claims that intuitions are the driving force of moral decision-making instead of emotions. He criticizes specific fields in academia for their overreliance on reason and rationality (Haidt, 2001).

At the same time, Haidt is one of the leading academic voices in promoting political diversity on college campuses, which he addresses as "viewpoint diversity" (Buckley Institute, 2015; Haidt & Jussim, 2016). Haidt (2016) believes there is not enough political diversity in academic departments, especially in the humanities and social sciences. Because social sciences tackle issues regarding race, gender, and politics, he argues, it is essential to understand different political voices. Increasing political diversity, in his view, will improve the quality of research in academia (Duarte et al., 2015). Haidt is also the chair and co-founder of the Heterodox Academy (<https://heterodoxacademy.org/>), a non-profit platform that claims to be non-partisan and working to improve the quality of research and education by promoting "open inquiry, viewpoint diversity, and constructive disagreement". He believes that if various political views are present in academia, scholars will engage in constructive disagreements and reduce the political bias in their research (Duarte et al., 2015, p. 11).

While it is debatable whether Haidt's arguments hold any merit individually, the goal of this paper is to reveal the latent tension between Haidt's social intuitionist model and his claims on viewpoint diversity. The reason for this tension is that the social intuitionist model devalues the role of reason in changing other's minds and moral development, whereas viewpoint diversity relies on the power of reason (Duarte et al., 2015; Haidt, 2003; Haidt & Jussim, 2016). How can viewpoint diversity help people uncover the truth (Haidt & Jussim, 2016), if humans rarely "seek for truth" according to the social intuitionist model? This paper will further elaborate on this tension and attempt to reconcile it by providing modifications to Haidt's intuition and conformity-driven suggestions for moral development so that both the social intuitionist model and viewpoint diversity

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can support each other. In their current forms, the conjunction of both of these theories will most likely fail in promoting open inquiry and reducing political bias. Therefore, it is crucial for scholars who see potential in Haidt's viewpoint diversity to recognize the tension, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of these frameworks.

This paper consists of four main sections. The first section will clarify the social intuitionist model and explain its foundations. The second section will elaborate on the foundation of viewpoint diversity. The third will argue the strengths and weaknesses of the social intuitionist model and viewpoint diversity. Finally, the fourth will conclude by raising suggestions for future research.

Understanding the Social Intuitionist Model

The Social Intuitionist Model

As mentioned before, Haidt's social intuitionist model is inspired by the philosophy of moral sentimentalism. David Hume, a well-known moral sentimentalist, argues that reason alone cannot account for moral judgments. According to Kauppinen (2021), Hume believes that emotions and desires play a more significant role in making moral decisions. Although Haidt agrees with Hume about the insignificance of reason in moral judgments, he believes that human intuitions are more important than emotions and desires in making moral decisions (Haidt, 2012). He believes that intuitions are not only desires or emotions, but also evolutionary mechanisms and cultural norms.

Despite currently embracing a fully intuitive approach, Haidt himself defined moral decision-making as "emotional" in an earlier paper. His paper, *The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail* (Haidt, 2001) introduces the dog metaphor for the first time to simplify the social intuitionist model. The emotional dog makes moral judgments based on emotions and wags its tail (a metaphor for post-hoc reasoning) to communicate the intuitive decision. Later on, in his book *The Righteous Mind*, he says, "in hindsight, I wish I had called the dog 'intuitive'" because some psychologists might assume that he claims emotion drives morality (Haidt 2012, p. 59). Therefore, the dog, formerly known as "emotional", is addressed as the "intuitive dog" for the rest of the paper. Haidt argues that "moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post-hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached" (Haidt, 2001, p. 814). This paper further introduces certain concepts for better clarity.

According to Haidt, moral judgments are evaluations of an individual's actions as bad or good based on the

cultural setting (Haidt, 2001). When a person processes the given information about others through active reasoning to make moral judgments, they engage in the act of moral reasoning. In his definition, Haidt (2001) excludes "any one-step mental processes" such as "sudden flashes of insight and gut feelings" from moral reasoning by referring to Kathleen Galotti's definition. In contrast, moral intuition is the unexpected, sudden appearance of a moral judgment without conscious awareness of reasoning and rationalizing (Haidt, 2001). Haidt quotes Hume in his paper, which compares moral intuition to the psychological process of aesthetic judgment (Haidt, 2001, p. 820). Aesthetic judgment can be described as the initial feeling one has when looking at a piece of art, which does not require any thinking or rationality, but rather comes intuitively (Haidt, 2001, p. 818).


The Foundations of the Social Intuitionist Model

Haidt's model provides a well-rounded illustration of moral psychology, in a way that acknowledges both the private and social links as well as the contributions of both reasoning and intuition in making moral judgments. His research on "moral dumbfounding" exemplifies the mechanisms of the social intuitionist model (Haidt et al., 2000). Moral dumbfounding occurs when participants make moral judgments about certain situations and insist on their moral judgment without being able to provide any reason for their decisions (Björklund et al., 2000; Haidt, 2001; Prinz, 2005). Instead, they may repeatedly say, "It's just wrong!" (Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Haidt et al., 2000).

This moral dumbfounding phenomenon relates to the previously introduced theory of cognitive dissonance. When humans are exposed to views that are dissonant with their own, they feel discomfort and may try to rationalize it (Haidt et al., 2000). In their research, Haidt et al. (2000) hypothesized that when participants are given scenarios that require intuitive judgments, they will not use their reasoning, but will make decisions based on their "gut feeling". They tested this hypothesis by presenting one scenario that will "trigger dispassionate moral reasoning" and four scenarios that will trigger passionate moral reasoning with emotions, specifically disgust (Haidt et al., 2000). During the moral dumbfounding experiments, participants were asked to judge situations, including taboo behaviors, while knowing no harm would be done by the act itself. For example, they were asked to share their moral judgments about consensual incest between siblings who used contraception, which had no risk of reproduction sexual intercourse with a dead supermarket chicken, or about using the pieces of the American flag to the toilet (Haidt, 2001; Haidt et al., 2000). They were assured that these acts would happen in private as well. Despite knowing there would not be any serious repercussions for the individuals or others, they

Figure 1*Haidt's social intuitionist model*

Figure 2.4. *The social intuitionist model*. Intuitions come first and reasoning is usually produced after a judgment is made, in order to influence other people. But as a discussion progresses, the reasons given by other people sometimes change our intuitions and judgments.



The social intuitionist model. Reprinted from “The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion”, by Haidt, J., (2012, August 3). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_intuitionism#/media/File:SocialIntuitionistCC.jpg.

said things like “I know it’s wrong, but I just can’t come up with a reason why” (Haidt et al., 2000). Participants used post-hoc reasoning to justify their stance. According to the authors, there are not many reasons to claim these acts are wrong if there is no harm done and if no one witnesses the action (Haidt et al., 2000).

Besides the moral dumbfounding cases, which have evolutionary and cultural foundations (Haidt et al., 2000), social factors also cause intuitive judgments. Haidt (2001) uses the example of hearing about a friend who has been mistreated by a person called Robert. If one hears this statement, one probably will not think of the good reasons Robert may have had for mistreating this person (Haidt, 2001, p. 828). In such a social situation, one can argue that psychological phenomena such as confirmation bias, motivated reasoning, and cognitive dissonance (as discussed earlier) can support Haidt’s model as well. Confirmation bias refers to interpreting information in a way that supports the existing beliefs, experiences, and expectations (Nickerson, 1998). Most of the time, we seem to be unaware of these biases as well. So, our background experience and expectations can influence the way we process and react to certain information, which can be a part of what Haidt identifies as an intuitive judgment. Motivated reasoning refers to the idea that pre-existing motives and beliefs can shape one’s perception.

Similarly to confirmation bias, motivated reasoning seems to play a role in our perceptions and decisions as well (Kunda, 1990). Ziva Kunda argues that humans are “more likely to arrive at conclusions they want to arrive at” (Kunda, 1990, p. 480) It is important to acknowledge that our motivations, which might be shaped by our biases, can have power in decision-making. These internal motivations can also be perceived as intuitions, as Haidt argues (Haidt, 2001, p. 820). Motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, and cognitive dissonance play active roles in Links 1, 2, and 3, which will be explained in the following paragraphs.

There is value in acknowledging that humans frequently use their reason as a lawyer to justify their moral judgement more than making fully rational and reason-driven decisions. Over-reliance on reason and diminishing the role of emotions/intuitions may not be the ideal way to approach human thinking. Therefore, this paper mostly agrees with the intuitive nature of moral judgment instead of a rational one. The point of disagreement arises from Haidt’s view on moral development, which will be discussed later in this paper.

Figure 1 shows Haidt’s graphical depiction of the mechanisms of moral judgment. He addresses the links within the social intuitionist model with arrows.

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Understanding these links is crucial in contemplating the criticisms and modifications suggested in the following sections. Links 1 and 2 are the most frequent; they happen automatically and intuitively. Links 3 and 4 represent the social components of the social intuitionist model, which Haidt argues to be more effective and often occurring than private thinking. Finally, links 5 and 6, the private thinking links, are dotted because Haidt suggests that they rarely happen.

Link 1 illustrates the intuitive judgment link. A triggering event that requires moral judgment activates A's intuition. Then, this intuition leads to a moral judgment. According to Haidt, link 1 occurs when sudden flashes of insight and gut feelings cause moral judgments; reasoning plays no role in this link. Link 2 illustrates the post-hoc reasoning link. After A's intuition causes a judgment, the individual starts producing post-hoc reasoning. This link happens when reasoning acts like a lawyer to justify intuitive judgments. Link 3 is the reasoned persuasion link used to communicate post-hoc reasoning with others. A's post-hoc reason directly speaks to B's intuition. When A and B agree, A's reasoning supports and strengthens B's intuition. However, A's reasoning will immediately contradict B's intuition when in disagreement and most likely cause more disputes. Sometimes, though not very often, this link can trigger new intuitions to make it possible to change someone's mind, Haidt claims (Haidt, 2001, p. 819). Link 4 is the social persuasion link, which merges from Solomon Asch's conformity experiments (Asch, 1956). These experiments showed that individuals mostly conform to the beliefs and opinions of the majorly represented groups. Originating from this phenomenon, Haidt argues that "people's privately held judgments are shaped by the judgment of others" (Haidt, 2001, p. 821). This is in line with the Social Identity Theory, which stipulates that humans tend to define their identity regarding their social groups (Tajfel & Turner, 2004). Therefore, they might adopt the moral judgments of their peers without question. Thus, individuals can change their behavior through conformity and their perception of social identity. Link 5 is the reasoned judgment link. It occurs when people make a judgment by sheer force of logic and override their intuition. According to Deanna Kuhn, only philosophers have this ability (Kuhn, 1991). For others, this link is rare and happens when "initial intuition is weak, and processing capacity is high" (Kuhn, 1991). However, when the judgment faces strong intuition, one might potentially show a dual attitude (Wilson et al., 2000). A dual attitude is when one verbally expresses reasoned judgment against their intuition while their intuitive decision remains to exist under the surface (Wilson et al., 2000). Link 6 is the private reflection link. Thinking about a situation triggers a new intuition that contradicts the initial intuitive judgment. Merging from Robert

Selman's research about perspective-taking (Selman, 1971), Haidt (Haidt, 2001, p. 819) argues that the most commonly known way of initiating contradictory intuitions happens through role-taking. For example, one may think that abortion feels wrong when thinking about the fetus, but may feel right when the focus shifts to the woman. Under such circumstances, Haidt argues, one may go through the "repeated cycles of links 6, 1, and 2" until they right and move on with that intuition (Haidt, 2001, p. 820).

As seen above, the social intuitionist model allows for moral change and development through four links (links 3, 4, 5, and 6). However, three of these links (links 3, 5, and 6) rarely happen according to Haidt (2001). Therefore, only the social persuasion link (link 4) is more effective in causing moral development. This approach raises some challenges, which are discussed in the next section.

Understanding Viewpoint Diversity

Foundations of Viewpoint Diversity

The emergence of viewpoint diversity is related to political changes in academia that occurred in the last few years. In their research, Duarte and his colleagues (2015) argue that in the previous 50 years, academic psychology had lost its diversity. They claim that, in the United States, especially in social sciences and humanities, Democrats outnumber Republicans by far. The research indicates that 58-66% of the professors in social sciences report being liberals, whereas only around 5-8% report being conservatives. This creates an 8 to 1 ratio in the distribution of political views (Gross & Simmons, 2007; Klein & Stern, 2009; Rothman & Lichter, 2008). This situation is exceptional compared to how academia was in the past, based on their observations from previous academic papers and interactions with academics (Duarte et al., 2015), and which, in their view, needs to be fixed. Haidt believes that promoting viewpoint diversity is the key to solving this problem (Haidt & Jussim, 2016).

Additionally, he believes it is crucial to understand the moral foundations of political beliefs to promote viewpoint diversity better. He and other scholars suggest a theory for the foundations of human morality to understand the nuances in people's moral behaviors (Haidt, 2012). This Moral Foundations Theory has six dimensions: a) care/harm; b) liberty/oppression; c) fairness/cheating; d) loyalty/betrayal; e) authority/subversion; and f) sanctity/degradation. These dimensions can vary across the political spectrum. Based on this theory, he argues that liberals and conservatives have different moral matrices (Haidt & Jussim, 2016). When it comes to politics, it is difficult to engage in constructive disagreement because

political discourse targets human morality. After all, Haidt (2012) argues that “morality binds and blinds” (p. 219). Morality binds because it can encourage humans to group together to strive for a common goal. Morality blinds because while being in that ingroup, humans have difficulty seeing the good in other groups. Moreover, Haidt (2012) claims that the most sacred moral value for liberals is the “care for victims of oppression” (p. 351). Liberal morality, in his view, rests on two foundations: care and liberty. Compared to conservatives, liberals have weaker responses to the other dimensions of morality.

On the other hand, the most sacred moral value for conservatives is “preserving the intuitions and traditions that sustain a moral community” (Haidt, 2012, p. 357). On loyalty, authority, and sanctity foundations, conservatives score higher than liberals (Haidt, 2012). Political discourse is challenging because of the major differences in the morality of conservatives and liberals. Therefore, understanding the moral causes of disagreement can lead to more constructive solutions and disputes. In addition to determining one’s political beliefs, the moral foundations are crucial to research in social sciences. If most scholars lean towards one political view, their research may risk representing only one side’s morality and political beliefs (Duarte et al., 2015). Therefore, some may argue that it is difficult to conduct objective research about race, gender, inequality, and politics without political diversity (Duarte et al., 2015; Haidt & Jussim, 2016). In Haidt’s view (2016), when the issues tackled by social sciences concern everyone’s morality to a high degree, political diversity is required for higher-quality research.

How Can We Teach the Intuitive Dog New Tricks?

To be sure, both Haidt’s moral psychology and his viewpoint diversity framework are controversial. For instance, scholars have raised criticisms of Haidt’s social intuitionist model, especially rationalists who believe humans make moral judgments based on reason. Saltzstein and Kasachkoff have argued that Haidt gives “relatively short shrift” (Saltzstein & Kasachkoff, 2004, p. 274) to reason and reduces “no role to reasoning, reduces the social influence to compliance, and fails to take a developmental perspective (Saltzstein & Kasachkoff, 2004). Pizarro and Bloom claimed that it is the “rational dog that wags the emotional tail, not vice versa” (Pizarro & Bloom, 2003, p. 194).

The blurry conception of what is moral is another weakness of Haidt’s social intuitionist model. Kauppinen argues that it is problematic that Haidt does not differentiate between moral and non-moral evaluations, and does not leave enough room for reason

(Kauppinen, 2021). He claims that we do not necessarily deem every action that triggers feelings such as disgust, anger, or dislike as immoral (Kauppinen, 2021). Contrary to Haidt’s arguments, Daniel Jacobson believes that humans do not lack reason in making judgments (Jacobson, 2012). As a criticism of Haidt’s moral dumbfounding experiments’ conclusions, Railton claims that Haidt’s sibling incest example can lead to serious “psychic harm” which can be a valid reason to reject this idea (Railton, 2017, p.187). Kauppinen (2021) argues that the fact that humans cannot verbalize these reasons immediately does not mean they are not thinking of them. Therefore, Haidt’s identification of the reasoning process as just a post-hoc justification would be quite inaccurate because there might be reasoning involved in what seems intuitive at first (Kauppinen, 2021).

Additionally, some scholars raised concerns about the validity and practicality of viewpoint diversity. Haidt’s emphasis on viewpoint diversity falls prey to bothsidesism (Ditto et al., 2019; Duarte et al., 2015; Malka et al., 2012). Bothsidesism, also known as false balance, refers to the inaccurate presentation of information and miscommunication to push a certain agenda (Dearing, 1995). As scholars argue, the lack of political diversity might not be as urgent or as significant as Haidt claims it to be. At this point, it is important to clarify that the current paper does not endorse or the social intuitionist model and viewpoint diversity, but rather explores whether these models can be reconciled.

While Haidt gave suggestions for improving moral judgment in the social intuitionist model, most of his recommendations rely on the social persuasion link (link 4; Haidt, 2001) instead of reason. He does not recognize the danger of “taking advantage of social persuasion” to improve moral judgment (Haidt, 2001). These suggestions are not practical, especially in relation to the promotion of viewpoint diversity. Reasoning should have a more prominent role in moral development to reduce political bias and partisanship. The following three suggestions are addressed in Haidt’s paper for the development or change in moral judgments:

- Perceive moral judgment as a part of culture and form an ideology where a “more balanced, reflective, and fair-minded style of judgment” is appreciated (Haidt, 2001, p. 829). He cites Kohlberg’s research (1989) in which he created an environment where students constantly enacted democratic practices to teach equality. Those practices reformed their thinking (Power et al., 1989).
- Utilize link 4 (social persuasion link) and try to engage with others who are known to be wise and open-minded. Haidt argues that intellectual

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engagement with these people will then initiate a set of conflicting intuitions in each other, potentially leading to a change in perspective (Haidt, 2001).

- To encourage people to engage in moral thinking and reasoning, we should teach them how to use links 5 and 6. In Haidt's view, this is the least effective method because he believes that attempts to teach moral thinking in class would not be transferred outside the classroom (Nickerson, 1994). Therefore, this method will not improve moral judgment (Haidt, 2001).

There are specific problems with each of Haidt's suggestions. The problem with the first suggestion is that creating a culture poses a significant danger to free inquiry and uncovering the truth, because it forces its members to conform. Additionally, one can argue that once humans establish the norms of a culture, it is difficult to break free from them. Regarding Kohlberg's experiments, the students who learned about equality through the culture of democracy might never consider alternatives to it (Power et al., 1989). Additionally, the culture of social justice in US colleges, which Haidt strongly opposes (Duke University Department of Political Science, 2016), was established with good intentions of liberal moral values (care/harm; Duke University Department of Political Science, 2016).

The problem with the second suggestion is that taking advantage of the social persuasion link also poses a danger because of social biases such as authority bias (the tendency to accept the opinions of authority figures), conformity biases (the tendency to accept the opinions of others to fit in to a social group), and the halo effect (tendency to accept the opinions of people we like or find attractive). Additionally, if one respects someone "for their wisdom and open-mindedness," they may also agree with them on political controversies (Haidt, 2001, p. 829). Therefore, the political dialogue will not contribute to viewpoint diversity.

The problem with the third suggestion is that it fails to recognize alternative education methods that can encourage the usage of links between 5 and 6. Also, it over-relies on only one study. If Haidt realizes that training and intellectual dialogues can encourage philosophers (who use link five more often than others) to reason well and use rationality, then teaching moral thinking is effective (Haidt, 2001).

Moreover, increasing the number of individuals who hold different political views in academia might not reduce political bias without learning how to engage with them, as is the case with affirmative action. Affirmative action in US educational institutions refers to policies attempting to increase the representation of

historically marginalized minorities in education (Fullinwider, 2018). Some colleges in the US preferential selection for certain races, genders, and ethnicities to increase the diversity on campuses (Fullinwider, 2018). Affirmative action in the long run can benefit marginalized individuals and communities who have not been represented in academia in the past. However, in addition to increasing diversity numerically, it is important to learn how to interact with diversity to create a more inclusive environment, especially for those differences to be understood and respected. Some criticisms of affirmative action have shown that students who benefit from affirmative action rarely engage with those who do not (Sowell, 2004, p. 182). Therefore, increasing diversity in numbers might not produce the desired outcomes. Similarly, this paper argues that increasing political diversity by admitting individuals with different perspectives might not be ideal to decrease political polarization. Of course, affirmative action's goal differs from viewpoint diversity's goal. Affirmative action promotes racial diversity, whereas viewpoint diversity promotes political diversity (Duarte et al., 2015; Fullinwider, 2018). Also, viewpoint diversity does not necessarily demand quotas to increase diversity (Duarte et al., 2015, p. 49). However, viewpoint diversity claims that having different political voices will initiate constructive disagreement and lead to open inquiry (Duarte et al., 2015). One can argue that if political polarization is evident in the United States and social media, having diverse political views might not necessarily reduce political bias in research. We need moral and political skills to engage with different perspectives and therefore reduce political bias truthfully. Scholars' attempts to enter the ocean of diversity without knowing how to swim in different political views may be doomed to fail from the start.

Undoubtedly, we need to improve moral thinking and engage with opposing political views. However, the recommendations from the social intuitionist model are contradictory to the viewpoint diversity suggestions. The framework for viewpoint diversity suggests "seeking feedback from non-liberals," "expanding the diversity statements," and "avoiding political hostility and presumptions" (Duarte et al., 2015, p. 49). These recommendations rely on reasoning and self-reflection more than social persuasion and fostering culture. Therefore, Haidt's promotion of viewpoint diversity is inconsistent with his illustration of the social intuitionist model.

Practical Skills for Constructive Disagreement

It is important to approach the previously mentioned problems with practical solutions. Therefore, certain practices are necessary to encourage the usage of links 5 and 6 inside and outside the

classroom. These practices will, in return, help scholars to engage in diverse political views in more constructive environments. Haidt (2012) believes this rational approach dismisses the role of social components. However, this paper does not come from a rationalist point of view. Instead, it seeks balanced practices to pursue moral development, which would value both reason and intuition.

One practical skill could be learning about moral thinking in a classroom with group discussions, group projects, or debate practices (Tumposky, 2004). This could encompass both the social and rational components of moral judgment. Most classes on ethics already attempt teaching about moral thinking, but the scenarios discussed in a classroom setting might not always apply to the real world because they encourage individual thinking (Tumposky, 2004). Therefore, it is important to establish more practical moral thinking practices through debates and group projects (Tumposky, 2004). Another method is exposing students to different views than the majority views to encourage perspective-taking and empathy. Many scholars have argued that empathy and role-taking are crucial to understanding other perspectives (Decety & Jackson 2004; Mason & Gibbs, 1993; Selman, 1971; Turner, 1956). Some even argued that role/perspective-taking in education improves prosocial behavior and advanced moral judgment (Lind, 2000; Mason & Gibbs, 1993). Different educational practices other than teaching moral thinking can utilize the benefits of role-taking and empathy. These educational practices will also foster healthy viewpoint diversity because the scholars will know how to engage with opposing views before being forced to engage with them. Unfortunately, there is not enough empirical research testing these practices and their contribution to individuals' moral development outside the classroom. This field requires further study, and hopefully, this paper will encourage scholars to conduct further research exploring the effects of group projects, debating, and role/perspective taking on moral development.

Another powerful method to practice is the "cognitive reappraisal of emotion," which is changing how one feels about a certain situation through active thinking (Buhle et al., 2014). Although Haidt roots for the role of intuition more than emotion in moral decision-making (Haidt 2012, p. 59), recent research in the field of neuroscience highlights the role of emotion. Kaplan et al. (2016) found that emotions play a role in belief persistence. Indeed, the activity in certain parts of the brain responsible for emotions and feelings, such as the insula and amygdala, could account for individual differences in persuasion. The findings of Buhle et al. (2014) and Jarcho et al. (2011) seem to confirm that emotion-processing regions in the brain

are activated when an individual must make a decision or experiences cognitive dissonance. They also argue that through cognitive reappraisal and more activation in the prefrontal cortex, one can become more likely to change their mind (Buhle et al., 2014; Jarcho et al., 2011). Although cognitive reappraisal is a method used mainly in cognitive behavioral therapy, it may have potential for utilization in educational settings as well.

As human beings engaged in frequent social interactions, we are sometimes exposed to points of view different than ours. Considering the potential of harm arising from political, religious, or cultural disagreements, it is crucial to understand the psychological mechanisms behind them to be able to reduce conflicts. Although Haidt (Haidt, 2012) claims that intuitions play a more significant role than emotions in moral decisions, recent neuroscientific research has shown that emotions are directly involved in our reactions to opinions that are different from ours (Kaplan et al., 2016). Therefore, emotion regulation and cognitive reappraisal can be useful in engaging in meaningful political conversations that contradict our political stance and moral values.

The intuitive dog does learn new tricks, as Haidt (2003) acknowledges, though it is both a challenging teaching and learning process. Learning and teaching how to engage with diverse opinions is a crucial skill that every dog should have, despite the challenges that might arise from that training. Therefore, it is crucial to provide regular training to equip the dog with the necessary skills with the right methods. This article took the required first steps by reconciling the social intuitionist model and viewpoint diversity to discuss methods for moral development, which will hopefully reduce political partisanship, extremism, and bias in academia.

Conclusion

Haidt's intuitive approach to moral judgment in the social intuitionist model contradicts his rational approach to moral judgment in promoting viewpoint diversity. The social intuitionist model does not allow moral development through reason, whereas that is all the viewpoint diversity relies on. This paper argued for the consideration of alternative methods for moral development to resolve the tension and equip scholars with skills to engage with diverse political views. Attempting to foster a specific culture or taking advantage of social conformity for moral development poses risks. Haidt's suggestions must include the aforementioned methods of teaching moral reasoning, perspective-taking, emotion regulation, cognitive reappraisal for a well-balanced social intuitionist model, and well-founded promotion of viewpoint diversity.

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